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SPECIAL REPORTS
provide something more than a rough estimate, although
absolute precision is not necessary. 24
It was conceded that the amount of the liability had
been shown in Hughes Properties; the payoff indicator
amounts were stipulated. 25 The Commissioner argued,
however, that the fact of liability would not be fixed for
any particular slot machine until a winner pulled the
machine handle. 26 Only then would all contingencies,
including the identity of the winner and the time of
payment, have disappeared.
Both the Claims Court 27 and the Federal Circuit28 held
for Hughes, viewing the liability as fixed by Nevada law at
midnight on the last day of the fiscal year. The all events
test was met on the final play of the machine before
year's end, "that is, the last change in the jackpot amount
before the amount is recorded for accounting purposes." 29
In Nightingale v. United States, 30 however, the Ninth
Circuit had come to a different conclusion on similar
facts involving another Nevada casino:
The one, indispensable ... event is the winning of
the progressive jackpot by some fortunate gambler .... Gambling being what it is, and gambling
odds being what they are, it is entirely possible that
no actual liability will ever occur .... [T]here is no
way of knowing when any particular progressive
"one armed bandit" will pay off, nor what the
amount of that payoff will then be. 31

.

Hughes. Properties and Nightingale, neither of which
implicated new section 461 (h) of the Code, thus produced
the conflict for Supreme Court review.
C. Supreme Court Decision
The Court ruled for Hughes: the obligation imposed by
the Nevada statute and regulations fixed a liability in fact
at the end of the casino's taxable year. The casino had
therefore properly deducted each year's increase .in the
payoff indicator total. In arriving at that conclusion, the
Court resolved a number of issues that had puzzled lower
courts and commentators in cases like Hughes Properties
prior to the 1984 Act:
1. Statutory Liabilities. An obligation under state law
can fix a liability prior to the performance that satisfies
the liability: "[A]s a matter of state law, [Hughes] had a
fixed liability for the jackpot which it could not escape." 32
This issue had been important, for example, in cases
involving statutorily mandated reclamation obligations
associated with strip mining. 33 The Internal Revenue
Service's position, rejected by the Court, had consistently
been that a statute is irrelevant in determining the fact of
a liability. A statute, the government argued, does not fix

See Jensen, supra note 11, at 462-67.
zs54 U.S.L.W. at 4574.
26 ld.; Brief for the United States at 13, Hughes Properties.
27 5 Cis. Ct. 641, 645, 84-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) paragraph
9616, at 84,778 (1984).
26 760 F.2d 1292, 1293, 85-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) paragraph
9359, at 87,943 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
29
5 Cis. Ct. at 645, 84-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH}, at 84,778.
30
684 F.2d 611, 82-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) paragraph 9533 (9th
Cir. 1982).
31
684 F.2d at 614, 82-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH), at 84,907.
32
54 U.S.L.W. at 4575.
33
E.g., Ohio River Collieries Co. v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1369
(1981) (holding that state statute fixed, in year land was disturbed, strip miner's obligation to reclaim mined land).
24
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an obliga.tion by itself, and it does not even strengthen
the case for deducting a liability arising under a bilateral
contract. 34 In either case, a liability remains contingent, in
the government's view, until performance. 35
2. Unknown Payee. A liabili!Y can befixed even though
the identity of the ultimate payee is not known: "The
obligation is there, and whether it turns out that the
winner is one patron or another makes no conceivable
difference as to basic liability." 36 Prior to Hughes Properties, the Service, in a number of cases involving worker's
compensation and similar obligations, had argued that
such a liability is necessarily contingent. 37 In the government's view, a liability cannot be fixed until some person
exists who can assert a claim against the taxpayer. 38
3. Uncertain Time for Payment. A liability can be fixed
even though the time of the future payment is unknown.
As the Court stated, "[O]nly the exact time of payment
and the identity of the winner remained for the future." 39
The Court noted, almost as an aside, that the government's brief "speaks of the time value of money," 40 but it
rejected that as a serious issue. 41
34 The Service's view has also consistently been that a bilateral
contract standing alone does not fix a liability prior to performance because no obligation to make payment solidifies until that
time. See LTR 7831003 (Apr. 13, 1978) (technical advice memorandum considering timing of deduction for strip miner's statutory reclamation obligation); Jensen, supra note 11, at 457-58
(describing LTR 7831003).
35 See LTR 7831003 (Apr. 13, 1978}; Jensen, supra note 11, at
457-60.
3 6 54 U.S.LW. at 4575.
37 The Service had generally been unsuccessful in its argument.
See, e.g., Kaiser Steel Corp. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1304, 83-2
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) paragraph 9621 (9th Cir. 1983) (permitting
current deduction to cover uncontested liabilities, under worker's
compensation laws, arising from injuries to employees); Washington Post Co. v. United States, 405 F.2d 1279, 69-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH} paragraph 9192 {Ct. Cl. 1969} (permitting current
deduction of accrued, but unpaid, contributions to n.ewspaper
dealer profit-sharing plan}; Ohio River Collieries Co. v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1369 (1981) (permitting current deduction for
future strip mining reclamation obligation even though identity
of party to perform reclamation was unknown); Reynolds Metals
Co. v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 943 (1977) {permitting current deduction for future payments to trusts under supplemental unemployment benefit (SUB) plans); Lukens Steel Co. v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 764 (1969), aff'd, 442 F.2d 1131,71-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) paragraph 9374 (3d Cir. 1971} (to same effect as
Reynolds Metals).
38 See Brief for the United States at 13, Hughes Properties. In
its reply brief, the government hinted that its position in some of
the-earlier cases involving "group liabilities," cited in supra note
37, may have changed. However, even if those cases were rightly
decided, the government argued, they were distinguishable from
Hughes Properties. In Lukens Steel, for example, the taxpayer
had an obligation to make payments, on behalf of its employees,
to a supplemental unemployment benefit plan trust. The government had at the time argued that such a liability was contingent
because, among other reasons, the identities of the· ultimate
payees were unknown. 52 T.C. at 786-87. While the government
now suggests that the obligation to the entity, the trust, may
itself have constituted a fixed liability, no such entity or other
group obligee existed in Hughes Properties: "The obligee may
be an individual or an entity; the obligee may be identifiable or
unknown; but there must be an obligee." Reply Brief for the
United States at 8-10, Hughes Properties.
3954 U.S.L.W. at 4575 (emphasis added).
40/d.
41
See infra notes 51-65 and accompanying text (discussing
time value of money and how 1984 Act deals with that issue).
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The Court's opinion does not make clear whether time
value issues were unimportant primarily because of the
particular facts of Hughes Properties. Where jackpots are
paid on the average every 4% months, the benefits of accelerated deductions would generally be. small. 42 However, the opinion can also be read to suggest that the time
value of money is always an irrelevant consideration
under the all events test. This latter reading is consistent
with the implication of prior cases: that the time value of
money, if it is an issue at all under pre-Act law, is properly
taken into account under other doctrines such as "clear
reflection of income." 43 ln any event, while the boundaries
of the opinion in Hughes Properties may be fuzzy on this
point, the Court clearly rejected the Service's long-time
contention that a liability is necessarily contingent under
the all events test if the precise time of payment is
unknown. 44
4. Possibility That Payment Will Not be Made. The fact
that a taxpayer may go out of business prior to satisfaction
of a liability does not necessarily make the liability
contingent. 45 Thus, although Hughes could have avoided

the jackpot obligations through its own voluntary actssurrendering its license or filing for bankruptcy, for
example-the liability remained fixed as long as those
possibilities were remote: "The existence of an absolute
liability is necessary; absolute certainty that it will be
discharged by payment is not." 46 U a legitimately deducted
liability is not ultimately satisfied, proper tax accounting,
the Court suggested, requires making a later adjustment
under the tax benefit ruleY This conclusion, which also
ignored the time value of money, 48 elicited a strong
dissent by Justice Stevens. Stevens argued that the
Court's opinion implicitly rejected the valid distinction
between (i) the nonpayment of an existing fixed (and
therefore potentially deductible) obligation and (ii) the
nonexistence of an obligation. 49 The progressive jackpot
guaranty, Stevens maintained, belonged in the latter
category until a winning pun of the handle. 5°
Each of these four issues had been important prior to
the Tax Reform Act of 1984. Hughes Properties thus
would have been instructive had there been no 1984 Act.
The next question for consideration, however, is whether
the Court's opinion is any help in analyzing similar cases
that are governed by new section 461 (h) of the Code.

42
1n the opinion, the recital of the machine payoff records, see
supra text accompanying notes 16-19, was not directly tied to
the limited discussion of the time value of money issues. Instead,
the Court merely noted that, "since the casino of course must
pay taxes on the income it earns from the use of as-yet-unwon
jackpots, the Government vastly overestimates the time value of
{Hughes's] deductions." 54 U.S.L.W. at 4576.
43
1.R.C. section 446(b) provides that "if the method [of accounti_ng] used does not clearly reflect income, the computation
of taxable income shall be made under such method as, in the
opinion of the Secretary, does clearly reflect income." The best..:
known instance in which the Service successfully attacked a
premature accrual on the basis of the "clear reflection" standard
is Mooney Aircraft, Inc. v. United States, 420 F.2d 400, 69-2 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) paragraph 9714 (5th Cir. 1969). In Mooney
Aircraft, the taxpayer had sought to deduct a liability that might
not be satisfied fo.r as long as 30 years. Although the technical
requirements of the all events test had been met in the case, the
court concluded that the possible time between accrual and
satisfaction was "too long," and that a current deduction therefore would "not clearly reflectincome." 420 F.2d at 409-10, 69-2
U.S. Tax Cas. {CCH), at 85,982. See Aidinoff & Lopata, Section
461 and Accrual-Method Taxpayers: The Treatment of Liabilities
Arising from Obligations to be Performed in the Future, 33 Tax
Law. 789,800-06 (1980); Jensen, supra note 11, at 469-72.
The trial judge and the Supreme Court in Hughes Properties
both suggested that the government has the power under I.R.C.
section 446(b) to correct abusive situations that nevertheless
meet the requirements of the all events test. The clear reflection
doctrine might apply, for example, {i) if a casino were to place
additional machines with very high jackpots on the floor near the
end of a taxable year solely in order to boost its deduction for
the year; (ii) if a casino were to set extremely high odds on some
machines to lessen the probability of payout in the near future;
or (iii) if a casino were to transfer guaranteed amounts from
machines with favorable payout probabilities to machines with
relatively unfavorable probabilities in order to defer indefinately
the payout obligation. 5 Cis. Ct. at 646, 84-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH), at 84,779; 54 U.S.L.W. at 4575-76.
44
See, e.g., Denise Coal v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 930, 935,
59-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) paragraph 9769, at 74,035 (3d Cir.
1959) (permitting current deduction for future strip mining
reclamation obligation); Lukens Steel Co. v. Commissioner, 52
T.C. 764, 784-85 (1969), aff'd, 442 F.2d 1131, 71-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) section 9374 (3d Cir. 1971) {permitting current deduction
for future payments to trust under supplemental unemployment
benefit plans).
4554 U.S.L.W. at 4576.

Ill. The Tax Reform Act of 1984 and Hughes Properties
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A. Background
The 1984 Act, by adding section 461 (h) to the Internal
Revenue Code, significantly changed the rules governing
the timing of deductions by accrual-basis taxpayers. The
Congress was concerned that the all events test, as
judicially constr~ed in some cases, permitted the deduc-

46 /d. {quoting Helvering v. Russian Finance & Constr. Corp., 77
F.2d 324, 327, 35-1 U.S. Tax Cas. {CCH) section 9367, at 9981
{2d Cir. 1935)). If bankruptcy had been more than an extremely
remote possibility for Hughes, the result in the case would
presumably have been different.
47 54 U.S.L.W. at 4576 (citing Treas. Reg. section 1.461-1 (a){2}).
48The tax benefit rule merely requires later inclusion of a dollar
amount equal to the amount of the deduction previously taken.
For example, if a one dollar deduction is taken in 1986 for a 1991
liability, and the liability is not satisfied, the taxpayer must
include the one dollar in income in 1991. Viewed from the
perspective of 1986, the taxpayer thus received a one dollar deduction with an inclusion obligation having a present value of
considerably less than one dollar. See infra note 51.
49 Justice Stevens, joined in dissent by Chief Justice Burger,
cited World Airways, Inc. v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 786 (1974).
aff'd, 564 F.2d 886, 78-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) paragraph 9149
(9th Cir. 1977). in which an airline's statutory obligation to
overhaul engines and airframes used for a certain number of
hours was held to be contingent because certain events, such as
bankruptcy or the crash or other disposition of an airplane,
could prevent the obligation from ripening. 54 U.S.LW. at 4576
(citing World Airways, 62 T.C. at 804). An airline subject to the
statute would have an obligation to overhaul the aircraft only if
the airline was going to proceed with business as usual.
50 Stevens suggested that a relevant consideration in determining whether a liability in fact exists is whether the claim is
one that would be discharged in bankruptcy, and a jackpot
guaranty clearly would not. 54 U.S.L.W. at 4576. The government, however, had not advanced such a position:
The point [in discussing bankruptcy] is not that [Hughes]
has creditors whose claims might be discharged in bankruptcy. The point is that no slot machine player could
even assert a claim against [Hughes] in bankruptcy unless
and until he had won a jackpot.
Reply Memorandum for the United States at 3, Hughes Properties. (Emphasis in original.)
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tion of amounts that exceeded the true cost of the
liabilities. For example, consider a taxpayer which could
demonstrate that it had a fixed, definite liability to pay
$100 in five years for an otherwise deductible expense.
With both the fact and the amount of the liability set, and
if no other statutory or judicial barrier intervened, the
taxpayer could deduct the full $100 currently, without
any discounting to reflect the time value of money.
Therefore, a liability with a present value of less than
$100 could generate a currentdeduction equal to the full
$1 00-a "premature accrual." 51

In challenging premature accruals prior to the 1984
Act, the Internal Revenue Service thus in effect added a
"performance" requirement to the all events test. An
alternative attack was available under section 446(b) of
the Code: a deduction much- earlier than performance
should be denied because it would "not clearly reflect
income." 55 The Service, however, seldom made such an
argument. 56 Instead, by formalistically concentrating on
the all events test, the Service burdened the language of
the regulation with more than it could carry. The regulation made no reference to performance, or anything like
that, and the Service's litigation record was accordingly
less than perfectY Frustrated by the courts, the Service
took its grievances to Congress.

The taxpayer could deduct the full [amount]
without any discounting to reflect the time
value of money.

B. Economic Performance Requirement
Congress, newly sophisticated in 1984 about the time
value of money, was receptive to the Commissioner's
pleas. To impose some rationality on the deduction
scheme, Congress in the Tax Reform Act required that a
deduction be taken no earlier than ''economic performance," thereby generally codifying the Commissioner's
prior position. The all events test was retained-indeed,
elevated from the regulations into the Code58 -but the
economic performance requirement was grafted on to
that test. 59 As a result, to be entitled to deduct a future
liability in the current taxable year, a taxpayer must now 60
demonstrate not only the fact and the amount of the
liability, but also that economic performance has occurred
or is occurring.

The Internal Revenue Service has never been happy
with premature accruals, but the reason for its concern
was not clearly articulated in the older cases and rulings.
The Commissioner did not speak in terms of the time
value of money until recently. 52 Although he provided no
underlying theory for his position, the Commissioner
generally fought any deduction taken prior to the time
that services were performed or property was provided. 5 3
In the above example, if the $100 liability is for services to
be performed in five years, the Commissioner would have
insisted, even without benefit of the modifications made
by the 1984 Act, that the deduction also be delayed for
five years. In the language of the all events test, the
Commissioner would have .argued that the fact,of the
liability is not fixed until the services are performed. If
successful in such an argument, and if the $100 is in fact
paid in five years, the Commissioner would have brought
the cost of the liability ($1 00 in five years) and the deduction for the liability ($1 00 in five years) into alignment.54
51
The present value of that future obligation, using a discount
rate of five percent compounded semiannually, is $78.12. That
is, if the taxpayer invested $78.12 today at a five percent after-tax
rate of return, it would have the $100 in five years necessary to
satisfy the liability.
52 See Jensen, supra note 11, at 477. In one sense, it is unfair to
the Commissioner to suggest that the time value of money was
not an articulated concern; attacks on accelerated deductions of
course have been motivated by the knowledge that, all other
things being equal, a deduction today is worth more than a deduction next year. The point here, however, is that no full theory
was developed by the Commissioner to justify his challenges to
premature accruals.
53 The Service was not entirely consistent in this posture. See,
e.g., Rev. Rul. 69-429, 1969-2 C.B. 108 (self-insured partnership
obligated to pay injured employees in installments, with the
payments fixed by the state Industrial Commission under
worker's compensation statute, permitted to deduct full undiscounted amount in year of award); see also Gunn, Matching of
Costs and Revenues as a Goal of Tax Accounting, 4 Va. Tax Rev.
1, 26 (1984) (discussing potentially absurd applications of Rev.
Rul. 69-429); McGown, Structured Settlements: Deduct Now and
Pay Later, 60 Taxes 251, 257 (1982) (discussing planning potential of Rev. Rul. 69-429).
54
lf payment is not made in five years but the taxpayer is
permitted a deduction at that time, a premature accrual will still
result, although it would obviously be less beneficial than a deduction in thE? same amount taken five years earlier.
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New section 461 (h) in general operates to
defer deductions . ...

Economic peformance in general occurs as activities
are performed that are necessary to satisfy the liability.
What constitutes economic performance depends on the
nature of the subject transaction. Economic performance
attributable to an obligation to provide or pay for property or services occurs only as the property or services

55

See supra note 43.
Mooney Aircraft is an unusual example in which the Commissioner successfully argued the clear reflection standard with
respect to a premature accrual. See supra note 43; Jensen, supra
note 11, at 470-72 (discussing possible reason why Service
generally did not press clear reflection argument).
57
See, e.g., Denise Coal v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 930, 935,
59-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) paragraph 9769, at 74,035 (3d Cir.
1959} (strip mining reclamation obligation under Pennsylvania
law held currently deductible); Harrold v. Commissioner, 192
F.2d 1002, 52-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) paragraph 9107, at 45,138
(4th Cir. 1951) (strip mining reclamation obligation under West
Virginia law held currently deductible); Ohio River Collieries Co.
v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1369 (1981) (strip mining reclamation
obligation under Ohio law held currently deductible).
58
Following the language of the regulations, I.R.C. section
461 {h}(4) provides that "the all events test is met with respect to
any item if all events have occurred which determine the tact of
liability and the amount of such liability can be determined with
reasonable accuracy."
59See supra note 4.
60
See supra note 3 (effective date of section 461 (h)).
56

TAX NOTES, September 1, 1986

are provided. 61 For liabilities arising from tort or worker's
compensation claims, economic performance occurs as
required payments are made to another person. 62 The
statute also provides that economic performance with
respect to a liability arising from the use of property (an
obligation under a lease, for example) occurs as the
property is used. 63 In all other cases, the Secretary of the
Treasury is directed to issue regulations governing the
determination of economic performance. 54
New section 461 (h) in general operates to defer deductions; that, of course, is why the provision was added to
the Code. Economic performance will usually be later
than, or will coincide with, the time at which the unmodified all events test is met. In most cases, economic
performance fixes the fact of a liability; prior to the Tax
Reform Act, even the Commissioner conceded that result.65 The first part of the all events test is therefore
generally redundant. In addition, the amount of a liability
will usually be reasonably certain, if not fixed, at the time
of economic performance. Hence, in most cases, the
critical consideration will be the time of economic performance; the requirements for deductibility will be met
no earlier than, but also no later than, that time.
C. Economic Performance and Hughes Properties
The facts of Hughes Properties, if governed by section
461 {h), would easily fit within the terms of the statute. A
careful analyst can discover many conceptual difficulties
with the application of the economic performance requirement,66 but none of those difficulties would be
involved in a progressive jackpot case. Economic performance under the statute would be deemed to occur at
the time that the machine's arm is pulled and the machine
disgorges its promise of riches; 67 the time that Hughes
provides services or property. 68 The fact of the liability
and the amount of the liability would also then be set.

61 1.R.C. sections 461 (h)(2)(A). 461 (h)(2)(B).
a21.R.0. section 461 (h)(2)(C).
63J.R.C. section 461 (h)(2)(A)(iii).
4
6 LR.C. section 461 (h)(2)(D).
65 See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text. Whether it
should have satisfied a Commissioner attuned to the time value
of money is another matter. If both economic performance and
fulfillment of the all events test precede payment or other
satisfaction of a liability, the benefit of a premature accrual still
exists under the new law. In that situation, section 461 (h) may
defer a deduction, but not long enough. See Jensen, supra note
11, at 483-84.
66 For example, until the issuance of clarifying regulations,
there may be difficulty in determining when economic performance has in fact occurred. When does economic performance
occur in a two-party, nonsimultaneous barter transaction, when
both parties to the transaction are providing property or services?
Does economic performance occur as party A provides property
or services or as party B provides property or services? And how
should economic performance be deemed to occur when property or services are provided over more than one year? See
Bowers & Stone, Some Items Still Deductible Under All-Events
Test Despite New Economic Performance Rules, 64 J. Tax'n 354,
355 (1986).
67
Perhaps the arm could be pulled a fraction of a second
before midnight on the last day of the taxable year, and the
winning combination could appear in the next taxable year.
Another theorist can determine in which year economic performance is deemed to occur in such~a case.
68
lt should not matter whether the casino is deemed to be
providin:g services or whether it is deemed to be providing
property.

TAX NOTES, September 1, 1986

Indeed, at that time, given the Nevada statutory and
regulatory scheme, 69 no uncertainty whatsoever would
remain: the obligation would be unquestionably fixed,
and the identity of the payee and the time of payment
would be unquestionably known.7°

Nothing in the Supreme Court's opinion is . ..
helpful . .. in deciding casino cases under the
1984 Act.

For future progressive jackpot cases, unless a statutory
exception to the economic performance requirement
applies, section 461 (h) provides exactly the result that
the government sought, and that the Court rejected, in
Hughes Properties: deferring the casino's deduction until
the jackpot is won. Only one exception to the economic
performance requirement can even arguably apply to
such jackpot obligations, and the application of that
exception appears to have a fatal flaw, as described
below. Accordingly, nothing in the Supreme Court's
opinion is necessary, or even helpful, in deciding casino
cases under the 1984 Act. The Court in Hughes Properties
answered a number of questions that have disappeared
from the consideration of similar fact situations. 71
D. A Brief Digression
The conclusion that section 461 (h) easily resolves
future progressive jackpot cases assumes that no exception to the economic performance requirement applies.
For "certain recurring items," 72 however, the Code in
effect relies on the unmodified all events test to determine
the timing of deductions. Since this exception, if it did
apply, would leave the authority of Hughes Properties
unimpaired, a brief digression is necessary to explain
why the exception appears not to be available. 73
The progressive jackpot obligations meet three of the
four requirements for application of the exception: (1) As
Hughes Properties decides, the unmodified all events test
is met in a year prior to the year of economic performance;74 (2) the obligations are recurring in nature
and are consistently accounted for by the casinos; 75 and
{3) the accrual of a jackpot obligation in an earlier taxable
year gives a better matching of income and expense than
would accruing the liability in the year of economic

See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
0The time of payment would be known unless the casino
contests, and does not pay, the liability. In that case, no deduction would be permitted until the contingency disappears. See
infra note 82 and accompanying text.
71 The issues have not disappeared, of course, from those
casino cases in the litigation pipeline that are not governed by
the Tax Reform Act. See supra note 5.
721.R.C. section 461 (h)(3).
73"Appears" is the appropriate word because, "in many if not
most of the cases, it will be difficult to determine it the exception
is available." Bowers & Stone, supra note 66, at 356.
74 l.R.C. section 461 (h)(3)(A)(i).
75 1.R.C. section 461 (h}(3)(A)(iii).
69
7
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performance.'6 On the third point, too, tr1e opinion in
Hughes Properties Is helpful: the Court gives surprisingly
great weight to the matching principle and the d etermination of "true income" in concluding that a deduction prior
to performance must be permi tted."
The final requirement tor application of the recurring
items exception is more p roblematic, however: economic
performance must occur no later than 8% months aft er
the c lose of the taxab.le yea r in which the all events test i s
met. 76 No regulations have yet specified the workings of
this (or an y other) requ irement of the excepti o n, but the
requirement can apply to progressive jackpots only if it is
very generously inter preted.
T he exception for recurring items was intended to
"avoid d isrupting normal business and accountin9 p ractices" when th e benefit of a premature accrual for an item
would be slight.n Progressive jackpots are, by their
natu re, not routine; the preci se timing for any particular
machine cannot be predicted in advance. Moreover, the
time val ue benefit of accr uing future liabilities for some of
the machines in any particular year may be substantial.
On the average, Hughes· progressive jackpots were paid
every 4'h months, c learly within the prescribed period.
But not all jackpots were so paid. One machine had not
been forthc oming wi th its prize for 35 months.no Nor can
it be said that the payment ot any particular jackpot more
than B'h. months after the end of a taxable year was aberrational; it was statistically to be expected that some
jackpots would be delayed to such an extent.
In sum, whether the appropriate "item" for analysis
under the recur ring ite ms exception is the aggregate of
the jackpot obligations for all machines or the jackpot
obligations with respect to any particular machine, the
8 % month test would not be met on a recurring basis.. The
economic performance requirement should therefore remain applicable to progressi ve jackpots.

: :
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761.R.C. section 461 (h)(3l(A)(iv). As an alternative to si'lowing
that better matching wou ld result from an e<U"Iier accrual, the
taxpayer may demonstrate that the item is not a ''material item."
For the evaluation of either alternative. the treatment of the item
on financial accounting statements must be taken Into account
I.R.C. section 461(h)(3)(B).
" The Court stated that
one of· the expenses that necessarily aMends the production of income from a ·progressive slot machine is the
commitment of a particular portion of the revenue gene.rat'ed to an Irrevocable jackpot. (Hughes's) true income
from its progressive slot machines is only that portion of
the money gamblod whi ch it is entitled to keep.
54 U.S.l.W. at 4576 (emphasis added). The government had
strenuously argued, with a great deal of support in recent
Supreme Court opinions (seo, e.g., Thor Power Tool Co. v.
Commissioner, 439 U.S. 522, 542 -43 (1979)), that matching is
not a significant tax accounting concept even though it continues
to be important for financial accounting purposes. See Brief for
the United States at 26-28, Hughes Properties. The Court agreed
that "financial accounti ng does not control for tax purposes"
because the purposes of tl:lEr two accounting regimes are different, 54 U.S.L. W. at 457 5, but it nevertheless deferred to the
matching principle. This resuscitation of an apparently dying
concept in tax law came as a surprise to some commentators.
See, e.g., Gunn, supra note 53: Jensen, supra note 11, at 472-76.
" I.R.C. secti on 461 (h)(3)(A)(ii). If a "reasonable period" after
the close of the taxable year is less than 8\7 months, that shorter
period governs.
" H.R. Coni. Rep. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 873 (1 984).
00Se&supra text accompanying note 17.
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IV. Hughes Properties and Noncasirto Cases
Section Ill' of thi s article concluded that, if the Tax
Reform Act of 1984 had applied to th'e facts of Hughes
Properties, the result would have been straightforward,
and the Supreme Court's analysis would have played no
role in reaching that result. Hughes P;operties quite
simply has noth ing to say about the fu tu re resolutio n of
·Sim il ar c ases.
T his i s not to say, however, that the opinion necessarily
has no futu re effect. Although the all events test, as
applied to liabilities, has been stripped of much of its
importance by the Tax Reform Act, it has not d isappeared
altogether; the test for current deductibility under secti on .
461 (h) is not solely economic performance. In those
cases in which economic performance precedes the
fulfillment of the o ld all events test, the all events test
retai ns vitality.

The all events test ... has been stripped of
much of Its Importance . ...

For example, consider a liability, for services already
performed. that i s contested by an accr ual-basis taxpayer.
Even though economic pef6rmance has occurred because
of the performance of tt'le services, the liability is not
cu rrently deductibl e because th e all events test has not
be en met The contest itself defeats the fact of the
liability , at.least in part,e: and the special Code provi sion
dealing with contested liabilities will help the taxpayer
only if the contested liability is fi rst paid. 82
The significance of Hughes Properties thus depends
o n the scope of cases In wh ich economic perform ance
m ay occ ur befo re both the fact and the amount of a
liability have been set. If there are few such c ases.
Hughes Properties is indeed an insignificant decisi on.
But this category of cases may not be small or inherently
unimportant. Indeed, General Dynamics, although it too
w ill be decided under pre-Act law, is an example of the
. continuing significance of th e all events test.

V. General Dynamics

A. Facts
General Dynamics and its affiliated corporations (collectively, GO) were requi red under col lective bargaining
agreements to maintain health insurance coverage for
GO employees. In 1972 GO, whi ch had earlier funded a
plan through private insurance carriers, took over the
insurance fun ction Itself. GD es tablished reserves to
meet its estimated liability and retained the two insurance
firms that had earli er provided coverage to evaluate and
approve benefit c laims. O n Its 1972 tax return GO deducted· its liability for medical services assumed to have

81 Jf only part of a liability is fi xed in fact and the amount thereof
can be dete~mined wi th reasonab le accuracy, the regulations, as .
yet not amended to reflect the 1984 Act, permit the deduction of
the fi xed·part. Treas. Reg. section 1.461 -1 (a)(2).
~I.A. C. section 461 (f) provides in ef1ect that the all events test
may be deemed met. despite .a taxpayer's contest ol a liability, if
a transfer or property or services is made to satisfy the liability.
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been performed during the year; that is, GD deducted not
only its liability for those employees whose claims had
been approved during the year, but also its estimated
liability for claims during the year that had either not yet
been filed, or, if filed, had not yet been approved.
The Commissioner denied the deductions for the estimates,83 even though the estimates were based on the
actuarial principles used by the insurance industry for
determining such "incurred but not reported" (IBNR)
claims. 84 The basis for the denial was the all events test.
The Commissioner contended that no deduction should
be permitted until an insurance company administrator
had approved a claim for payment. At any earlier time,
GO could establish no liability in fact: either an employee
might not file a claim or, for one reason or another, the
administrator might deny the claim. 85 Accordingly, in the
government's view, any deduction permitted would be
with respect to "expenses that [GO] may never incur at
all."sa
GD prevailed at both the Claims Court87 and Federal
Circuit88 levels. The last event necessary to fix liability
was held to be the "occurrence of the insured event," 89
that
the provision of medical services. In taking a
deduction, "[GD wasJ not predicting the happening of
future events; rather, [it was] estimating the amount of
fixed liability for events which had already occurred." 90
Not everything reflected in a reserve account would
necessarily be paid to claimants, but absolute certainty is
not required to establish the fact of a liability. The all
events test must be applied in a~'reasonable and practical
matter," 91 and, so applied, the courts held, the test was
met.

83
With respect to those claims already approved but not yet
paid, there was no dispute about deductibility under the all
events test. The 1984 Act, had it applied to these claims, should
have added no furtttler uncertainty. Economic performance would
have occurred with the provision of the medical services, and the
liability would therefore have been deductible no later than the
year of claim approval. Since claim approval could occur in a
taxable year earlier than the year of payment, see infra note 101,
the government effectively conceded that a premature accrual
could result from some approved claims. See supra note 65;
infra note 102.
84
GD followed actuarial principles, but it did not claim it was
an "insurance company" specially entitled for that reason to
deduct additions to reserves. See I.R.C. section 807 (permitting
deduction for additions to reserves by life insurance companies);
I.R.C. section 832(b){5) {permitting deduction for additions to
reserves by casualty insurance companies}.
85
The administrator was required to determine ~'whether the
medical procedures were covered by the health plans, whether
stipulated maximum charges had been exceeded, and whether
the treatment was medically necessary." Supplemental Memorandum for the United States at 2, United States v. General
Dynamics (No. 85-1385}. About 90 percent of the amounts for
which GO's employees claimed reimbursement had historically
been approved for payment. General Dynamics Corp. v. Un;ted
States, 6 Cis. Ct. 250, 254, 84-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) paragraph
9783, at 85,322 (1984).
66
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8, General Dynamics.
67
6 Cis. Ct. 250, 84-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) paragraph 9783
(1984).
88
773 F.2d 1224, 85-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) paragraph 9688
{Fed. Cir. 1985).
89
6 Cis. Ct. at 255, 84-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH), at 85,323.
90/d.
(
91fd.
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By validating GD's actuarial principles, the lower courts
approved the use of probability theory to determine the
fact of a liability. It is important to understand the narrow
scope of the holding. The Claims Court and the Federal
Circuit did not hold that probability theory could be used
to generate a current deduction for medical services to
be provided to employees in future years. Based on its
experience, GO presumably could have estimated such
future expenses with a fair degree of accuracy. But the
permitted deduction for as-yet-unpaid expenses was
limited to those arising from medical services already
provided to employees. In seeking Supreme Court review,
the government suggested that the Federal Circuit's
opinion, if left standing, may permit taxpayers to deduct
payments to self-insurance reserves generally. 92 However,
that argument grossly overstates the holding of the case.
In no way does General Dynamics approve a deduction
for additions to reserves to cover events that have not yet
occurred, 93 and the deductibility of such additions will,
therefore, not be before the Supreme Court. 94

The lower courts approved the use of probability theory to determine the fact of a liability.

The Court in General Dynamics will also not consider
the application of probability theory to determine the
amount, as opposed to the fact, of a liabitity. In the courts
below, the government challenged the reasonable accuracy of the estimated amounts, but it did not request
Supreme Court review of that issue. 95 The government's
unwillingness to press this second point at this time 96 is
unfortunate because General Dynamics contains some
interesting features. For example, a Court opinion could
have provided guidance about the extent to which the
Commissioner may use hindsight (that is, the actual
amounts necessary to ultimately satisfy a liability) to

92 See Reply Memorandum the United States at 4-5, General
Dynamics. The government cites an article in Forbes to show
that the business community viewed the Federal Circuit decision
as having far-reaching consequences. According to the article,
the decision was a "light on the horizon" that would permit
deductions for "[p]ayments made to self-insurance reserves"
and thus properly blur the distinction for tax purposes between
insurance companies and noninsurance companies. Saunders,
Light on the Horizon, Forbes, Mar. 24, 1986, at 120.
93 0verstatement and misstatement on this subJect by popular
business periodicals appear to be common. See supra note 92;
Seligman, Playing the Slots on an Accrual Basis, Fortune, July 7,
1986, at 100 (favorably discussing Court decision in Hughes
Properties, but misstating holding in Mooney Aircraft, see supra
note 43, and ignoring effect of Tax Reform Act of 1984}.
9 4 lf that issue were before the Court, there would be no doubt
about the result. Brown v. Helvering should control, see supra
note 23, and no current deduction should be permitted.
95 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 13 n.2, General Dynamics.
96The government did not agree that the lower courts had
ruled properly on the amount of liability issue, see id., and it is an
issue that surely will be seen again.
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